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Developing Proactive Methods for General Aviation Data Collection
INTRODUCTION

• Low risk perception/overconfidence (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001)
• Poor in-flight planning (Detwiler et al., 2006; Stokes,
Belger, & Zhang, 1990; Knecht, 2005)
• Inability to execute a 180 degree turn (Wiegmann &
Goh, 2003; AOPA, 2004)

Operating a general aviation (GA) aircraft, particularly
when flying cross-country, requires dedicated planning
and decision-making involving such issues as the route
of flight, terrain and obstacles one might encounter, and
the threat of adverse weather. Some of these challenges
remain fixed (e.g., terrain and other obstacles) and are
relatively straightforward to address, while others, such
as weather, are dynamic and can pose unique challenges
to pilots. Indeed, even the best flight plans can prove
inadequate or incomplete where the volatile nature of
adverse weather is concerned.
Even with its unpredictable nature, pilots are still
expected to fully understand the weather enroute and to
avoid severe weather when planning and executing their
flight (National Transportation Safety Board, 2006).
Specifically, Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 91.103 mandates that when conducting a flight under
instrument flight rules (IFR) or away from the airport
pilots should become familiar with weather reports and
forecasts (Federal Aviation Regulations/Aeronautical
Information Manual, 2009).
Despite the regulations that require pilots to fully understand and appreciate the risk associated with adverse
weather, weather-related GA accidents continue to occur.
To put this in perspective, over the last 20 years, nearly
40,000 GA aircraft have been involved in accidents;
of these, roughly 20% involved fatalities (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2009). Notably, many of those fatal accidents
involved encounters with adverse weather (Detwiler,
Boquet, Holcomb, Hackworth, Wiegmann, & Shappell,
2006; Wiegmann, Boquet, Detwiler, Holcomb, Faaborg,
& Shappell, 2005; NTSB, 2005).
So, why would a pilot fly into adverse weather, particularly when the consequences can be so dire? Unfortunately,
the answer continues to be debated among academics and
regulators, alike. Some of the more prevailing explanations
have recently been summarized by Wiegmann, Talleur,
and Johnson (2008) and include:
• Lack of knowledge and experience (Goh & Wiegmann,
2002; O’Hare & Owen, 2002; Wiegmann, Goh, &
O’Hare, 2002)
• Poor pre-flight planning (Wiggins, Stevens, Howard,
Henley, & O’Hare, 2002; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003)
• Limited weather-evaluation skills (Goh & Wiegmann,
2001; Wiegmann, et al., 2002; Burian, Orasanu, &
Hitt, 2000; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003)

Some have even suggested that encounters with adverse
weather represent the willful disregard for the rules and
regulations (Wiegmann et al., 2005). After all, it is incomprehensible to some that a pilot who sees threatening
weather in his path would elect to continue into it if a
safer alternative is available. The problem with this latter
view is that it is based upon accident data that are arguably limited, particularly when the pilot is fatally injured,
and the exact causes of accidents are based as much on
conjecture and expert opinion as they are on fact.
Despite the uncertain nature of fatal accident data,
aviation safety has historically been driven by accident
databases archived and maintained by organizations like
the National Transportation Board (NTSB) and Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). However, at some point,
relying solely on accident data will yield fewer and fewer
positive interventions – particularly as the historical accident rates are driven down to the level of rare events.
This is precisely what has happened within the commercial aviation industry. As a result, emphasis within
commercial aviation has moved from accident data to
more proactive and normative data sources and risk
analysis. For instance, programs like flight operations
quality assurance (FOQA), the aviation safety action
program (ASAP), and line operations safety audits (LOSA)
have been developed and embraced by the commercial
aviation industry.
At a minimum, these proactive and normative data
sources have expanded our understanding of the human
factors associated with commercial aviation accidents and
incidents and have broadened how accident/incident
causation is viewed. However, even established datacollection tools like these continue to be modified and
have yet to be leveraged throughout the aviation industry
– particularly GA where equipment, programs, and access
are less regulated and standardized.
Left with few alternatives, many studies of GA flight
into adverse weather have utilized simulation, surveys,
and structured interviews. One particularly unique study
of interviewed pilots was that they were flying in the vicinity of, but not directly involved in, a weather-related
1

METHOD

accident (NTSB, 2005). This study was conducted to
render a different perspective than that of the accident
pilot, who in most cases is fatally injured. This represented
a significant departure from traditional accident studies in
that the pilots interviewed were not directly involved in
the accident but were exposed to similar environmental
conditions (e.g., weather and terrain). Among the more
notable findings were:
• A pilot who starts flying earlier in life is at lower risk of
being involved in a weather-related GA accident than
those who start flying when they are older.
• Chronological age at the time a pilot obtains a license
to fly is a better predictor of future accident involvement than age at time of flight.
• Periodic training and evaluation may be necessary to
ensure that pilots maintain weather-related knowledge
and skills.
• GA pilots routinely consult other sources of aviation
weather to obtain information that is not currently
available from a standard weather briefing (i.e., Flight
Service Station).

Although there are more traditional ways to identify
pilots who encountered adverse weather and survived
(e.g., NTSB accident records and ASRS reports), this
study employed two previously untapped resources: 1)
the Administrators’ Daily Alert Bulletins that identify
incidents, accidents, and pilot deviations on a daily basis,
and 2) air traffic control flight assists. The latter occur
when pilots request the assistance of air traffic controllers
to navigate their aircraft or when an air traffic controller
initiates an interaction with a pilot for safety purposes.
Many of these interactions involving flight through or
around adverse weather are reported to responsible FAA
officials and were of particular interest. Monitoring these
events is consistent with FAA order 8000.1, Safety Management System Doctrine, which states:
The safety assurance process continually assesses activity
to identify new hazards and to ensure risk controls achieve
their intended objectives throughout the system life cycle.
New hazards may be those not identified during the SRM
process or those introduced by the risk controls. This includes assessment of the need for new risk controls or to
eliminate or modify risk controls that are ineffective or are
no longer needed due to changes in the operational environment. Every SMS includes a process for continuously
monitoring systems of interest to identify new hazards or
the need to change risk controls or other risk management
responses. These monitoring activities apply to an SMS
whether the operations are accomplished internally or
outsourced. (FAA Order 8000.1, Section 2-5.3.a.).

As useful as the NTSB study was, most would agree
that information from a pilot involved with the adverse
weather encounter would be even more valuable. The
challenge is to identify a source of data involving actual
pilot encounters with adverse weather.
One relatively untapped source of information is nearmiss data. By definition, these are not accidents and, as
such, the pilots involved are alive and can presumably
recount their decision process. Of course, this assumes that
those issues that influence performance during accidents
also influence near misses in a similar way.
One such “near-miss” database already exists. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is an anonymous database that relies on self-reported incidents and near-miss
data. However, ASRS reports are not necessarily focused
on any specific type of incident or near-miss. Moreover,
they require the individual to self-report, which may
constrain submitted information, and certainly does not
go to the level of detail required for a full understanding
of pilot decision-making (Macrae, 2009). In sum, what
is needed is a better understanding of exactly how and
why a GA pilot would encounter adverse weather straight
from the source – the pilot who made the decision and
experienced the weather encounter.

With both data sources, attention was paid to events
involving visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC), convective and icing
encounters, and instrument-rated pilot control difficulties in actual IMC.
Participants
More than 175 events were reviewed, of which 115
were included as candidates for this study. Scientists
from the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI)
contacted the Flight Standards District Office (FSDO)
aviation safety inspectors (ASIs) responsible for the
candidate events to describe the project objectives and
request permission to communicate with the involved
pilot. Note that in some cases no investigation had been
conducted prior to CAMI contact. In total, more than 160
ASIs from roughly 55 different FSDOs were contacted.
From the ASI inquiries, approximately 50 potential participants were identified and contacted via
the telephone, E-mail, or postal mail, depending on
the type of contact information received. After being briefed on the purpose of the project, including
the anonymous nature of their responses, pilots who
2

agreed to participate were provided a consent form
and scheduled for a telephone interview.
Twenty-seven pilots who experienced an adverse
weather encounter were subsequently interviewed. Two
pilot interviews were eliminated because one was interviewed during initial beta testing, and the other did not
meet our research needs. This left 25 pilot interviews in
the final analysis.

• Whether they were suffering from any illness the day
of the flight
Event Information
Pilots were asked to describe their weather encounter
in detail. Several additional demographic questions related
to the flight were also asked, including:
• Purpose of the flight (i.e., business or pleasure)
• Had they flown the route before and if so, how many
times?
• Planned length of flight
• Departure airport
• Approximate temperature at departure
• Time of departure
• Planned destination airport
• Type of approach planned for destination (i.e., Visual,
Cat I, II, or III)
• Planned alternate destination airport
• Whether they communicated with ATC or any other
services (e.g., Flight Service Stations) while enroute
• In-flight services requested (e.g., an emergency climb/
descent, vectors to an airport or visual meteorological
conditions (VMC), pilot reports (PIREPS), weather
updates, or instrument approach procedures)
• Lighting conditions (e.g., daylight, night, dusk, dawn)
• Weather conditions (i.e., IMC, VMC, marginal VMC)
at departure, enroute, and at the destination
• Time of arrival at their intended or alternative destination

Instrument
The roughly one-hour interview was developed using
surveys previously employed by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and the FAA (NASA,
2007; Knecht, 2008a and 2008b). The structured interview included several items on basic aircraft and pilot
demographics, a description of the event, preflight planning, and weather decision-making. A brief description
of each section of the structured interview follows:
Aircraft Demographics
Pilots were asked standard demographic questions,
such as the type of aircraft they were flying during the
weather encounter and whether they leased, partially, or
fully owned the aircraft.
Pilot Demographics
In addition to traditional demographic questions
like education, profession, gender, and age, several items
regarding piloting experience and training were asked of
the pilots. Specifically, they were asked:
• When they first learned to fly
• The date of their most recent flight instruction
• The date of their most recent biennial flight review
• Class of medical certificate they held and whether any
waivers or limitations were attached
• Ratings and certificates they held (e.g., single engine
land, certified flight instructor, and instrument rating)
• Flight hours flown before the adverse weather encounter
(total and 90 days prior to the event)
• Number of cross-country flight hours flown before
the adverse weather encounter (total and 90 days
prior to the event)
• Instrument flight hours flown before the adverse
weather encounter (simulated and actual instrument
flight)
• Type of equipment (e.g., weather-avoidance, terrainavoidance, autopilot, GPS, and de-icing) onboard
the aircraft; if onboard, was it used during the flight
and had the pilot received formal training for its use
• Whether they participated in FAA-sponsored WINGS
programs
• Whether they obtained a good night’s sleep before
the flight

Preflight Planning
Of particular interest in this study was the method
of preflight weather planning employed by the pilots.
Pilots were asked to describe their normal method of
preflight planning and whether it was different the day
of the weather encounter. They were also asked:
• Whether they attempted to obtain pre-flight weather
information
• The last time they checked weather before flight
• Which weather providers they typically use when
planning a flight (e.g., National Weather Service,
flight service stations, direct user access terminal, and
hazardous in-flight weather advisory service) and if
those were used before the incident flight
• Were any attempts to obtain pre-flight weather information unsuccessful and if so, why?
• Whether the actual weather experienced was the same
as, better, or worse than predicted when they departed,
enroute, and at their planned destination
• Whether they considered the geography along the
flight route (e.g., mountains and rising terrain)
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Enroute decision-making
Because all participants had encountered adverse
weather, several questions were asked regarding their
enroute decision-making. Specifically, pilots were asked:
• Whether they were under any pressure to get to their
destination
• Whether they were aware of their course and location
throughout the flight
• Whether there were any distractions in the cockpit
• Whether all the equipment was working during the
flight
• What was their level of weather awareness during
the flight
• What was their thought process upon entering the
weather
• How did they feel upon encountering the weather
• Had they ever experienced similar weather conditions
• Whether they considered returning to their departure
point or performing a 180 degrees to avoid weather
• Whether they had to divert from their planned destination and if so, was it before or after encountering
the weather
• Whether they encountered the weather after reaching
the half-way point of the flight
• What they did to prevent the encounter with weather
from being worse
• Whether they would have done anything differently

Weather Information
In addition to pilot interview data, information was
obtained regarding the atmospheric conditions during
the time and at the location of each flight and weather
encounter. Archived meteorological data associated with
each event in the final database were obtained from the
National Climatic Data Center. Relevant aviation weather
reports were reviewed including:
• Routine aviation meteorological reports (METARs)
• Terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAFs)
• Airman’s meteorological information (AIRMETs)
• Significant meteorological information/ advisories
(SIGMETs)
• Precipitation reflectivity fields from the National
Weather Service’s Doppler Radar Network
The METARs and TAFs were collected for the departure, destination, and encounter/diversion times and
locations in each case. The AIRMETs, SIGMETs, and
radar data were collected for the routes/times of flight, and
the encounter times and locations were also documented.

RESULTS
Pilot information
All pilots interviewed were male, ranging in age from
20 to 72 years old, with an average age of 50 years. Ten
pilots (40.0%) were between the ages of 40 and 59, and
nine (36.0%) were 60 and over. All pilots had completed
some college coursework and almost half (48.0%) had
received graduate level training. Many of the pilot
participants were employed as professional pilots or as
business owners.

Procedures
The structured interview was conducted using a
conference call involving scientists from CAMI, Clemson University, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
(ERAU), and the pilot participant. After reviewing the
purpose of the interview and confirming the anonymous
nature of the study and other elements of the informed
consent, the roughly one-hour structured interview was
conducted (see Appendix A for the actual structured
interview questions). Responses were independently
recorded for later comparison. Note that the interview
was not audio-taped, only hand-written or typed notes
of the interview were produced.
After the interview was completed, recorded responses
were compared to ensure the accuracy of the record. A
single consensus file was then sent to the pilot for review.
This gave the pilot-participant an opportunity to ensure
the accuracy of the recorded responses and to modify or
clarify any responses given during the interview. Once
the interview had been reviewed and accuracy ensured
by all parties, the responses were combined with the
others contained within a de-identified master database
of pilot interviews.

Pilot Certification
All pilots had a basic pilot certification of airplane
single engine land and were medically certified to fly.
Over half (60.0%) held a Class III (private pilot only)
medical certificate, with the remaining pilots holding
either a Class II (commercial, non-airline duties, and
private pilot; 24%) or Class I (scheduled airline) medical
certificate (16%). In addition to the single engine land
rating, 36.0% of pilots held a multi-engine rating, 24.0%
held a commercial rating, and 20.0% were certified flight
instructors. Additionally, most of the pilots (76.0%) were
instrument rated.
Flight Experience
Although flight experience varied greatly among the
pilots, our pilot cohort can be considered experienced
pilots. A summary of their flight experience is presented in

4

Table 1. Pilot participant flight experience
Total flight hours
Total hours in event aircraft
make/model
Total hours in last 90 days
Cross-country hours
Cross-country hours in last 90 days
Actual instrument hours (n=16)
Simulated instrument hours (n=13)
Total instrument hours (n=15)

Median

Minimum

Maximum

1,100.0

130.0

20,000.0

300.0

4.0

5,000.0

40.0
700.0
36.0
164.0
45.0
145.0

2.0
35.0
0.0
4.0
10.0
7.0

250.0
14,000.0
250.0
2,970.0
242.0
3,000.0

Note: Flight hours were rounded to the nearest tenth.

Table 1. As can be seen, experience varied greatly, ranging
from 130 total hours to 20,000 total hours. The median
for the group was 1,100 total hours of experience. Note
that because of the wide range in flight hours, the median
was viewed as the best measure of central tendency. Actual
instrument flight time also varied markedly, ranging from
4 to 2,970 hours with a median of 164 hours.
Most of the pilots (56.0%) first learned to fly within
10 years of the adverse weather encounter. More than
two-thirds of the pilots (68.0%) received some degree
of formal flight instruction within the year prior to the
weather encounter. However, two (8.0%) of the pilots
had not received formal flight instruction in more than
a decade.
The majority of the pilots (80.0%) had completed at
least one biennial flight review (BFR), and most (70%)
had completed a BFR within 1 year of the weather encounter. It was also interesting that almost half (48.0%)
of the pilots had participated in FAA-sponsored WINGS
programs, which provide voluntary training to enhance
pilot proficiency and safety.

Several types of aircraft were represented in this study.
While most were single-engine, propeller-driven aircraft
(e.g., Cessna, Beechcraft; 84.0%), there were a few multiengine aircraft (e.g., KingAir and Piper; 12.0%) and one
Learjet. The top-three aircraft manufacturers were Cessna
(32.0%), Piper (20.0%), and Mooney (16.0%).
Almost all (96.0%) of the pilots had at least one GPS
inside the aircraft. Approximately two-thirds (62.5%) of
the aircraft had terrain avoidance equipment and over
half (56.0%) had on-board weather-avoidance equipment. Almost half (44.0%) of the aircraft had de-icing
equipment, and most (79.2%) were equipped with an
autopilot.
Preflight planning
Preflight planning is critical in every flight. Included
in a comprehensive preflight are such things as the aeronautical integrity of the aircraft, engine maintenance, fuel
quantity, route planning, alternate airports, and weather.
While all are important, route planning, alternate airports,
and preflight weather planning were of greatest concern
in this study.
Route Planning
Our sample included routes across a variety of geographical locations; however, most occurred in the Southern and Northwest Mountain regions, as defined by the
FAA. A regional map of where the weather encounters
occurred is presented in Figure 1.
The majority of the flights (75.0%) took place during
the day and were conducted mainly for business (40.0%)
and pleasure (48.0%); the remaining flights were for
multiple purposes (8.0%) and training (4.0%.) Most of
the flights (80.0%) were planned to last up to 5 hours,
with an average flight time of just more than 2 hours.
The majority (76.0%) of pilots had planned a visual
approach to landing at their destination.
All pilots considered the geography that they would
encounter enroute and approximately two-thirds (64.0%)
had flown the route before. Likewise, most (64.0%) of
the pilots had planned an alternate airport in advance of

Physical and Mental Health
The majority of the pilots (92.0%) reported feeling
well on the day of the weather encounter. Those who were
feeling worse than normal that day reported allergies or
were recovering from being sick a few days prior to the
flight. However, all had obtained a good night’s sleep
the night before the flight. Most did not feel pressured
to get to their destination; however 20.0% of the pilots
reported having some form of motivation to arrive at
their planned destination (i.e., wanting to get home as
soon as possible.)
Aircraft information
Not surprisingly, a variety of aircraft was represented in
our sample. Most of the aircraft were owned by the pilot
(60.0%). The remaining pilots flew either a companyowned (24.0%) or rental (16.0%) aircraft.
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Figure 1. Location of weather encounters using FAA defined regions.
Table 2. Number of pilots using the specified weather services on the day of the
weather encounter and in general (n=22)1
Number of sources
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1

Used day
of encounter
0
4
6
4
2
2
4
0
0

Number of Pilots

Typically
used
1
0
4
3
2
3
3
4
2

Note that the sample size is 22 because this item was added after the first interviews were complete.

takeoff in the event of encountering difficulties enroute.
While alternate airports may not be important when flying
locally, most of these flights involved cross-country flying,
and alternate airports should normally be considered.

information in their typical manner; in those cases, weather
information was obtained from alternate sources.
Pilots were also asked about the weather services they
used during the day of the encounter and which services
they typically used. However, after a few interviews, the
questions were modified to increase the specificity of the
pilot responses. Table 2 presents the number of weather
services that the pilot participants used, both typically
and on the day of the weather encounter.
The data revealed that the pilots in this study “typically” used between one and nine weather sources to access weather information, with an average of 5.6 sources.

Weather Planning
All pilots had obtained some type of weather information prior to departure on the day of the weather encounter,
and most (76.0%) accessed weather information less than
30 minutes before departure. The sources that the pilots
used to access weather information varied. However,
only three pilots experienced difficulty accessing weather
6

Table 3. Weather services used that day and typically used, by number of pilots (n=22)2
Used Day of Encounter

Typically Used

14
63.6%
15
68.2%
11
50.0%
11
50.0%
4
18.2%
3
13.6%

16
72.7%
17
77.3%
12
54.5%
17
77.3%
9
40.9%
5
22.7%

0
0.0%

1
4.5%

6
27.3%
12
54.5%
6
27.3%

10
45.5%
16
72.7%
13
59.1%

National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
Flight Service Station
DUATS
Commercial vendor
Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service
Transcribed Weather Broadcast
Pilots Automatic Telephone Weather Answering
Service
En Route Flight Advisory Service
Weather Channel
Other Pilots
2

Note that the sample size is 22 because this item was added after the first interviews were complete.

Table 4. Weather forecast

Departure Airport
En Route
Destination Airport

VMC

Marginal VMC

IMC

16
(72.7%)
8
(36.4%)
13
(61.9%)

3
(13.6%)
6
(27.3%)
5
(23.8%)

3
(13.6%)
8
(36.4%)
3
(14.3%)

Note: n= 22 data for the departure and en route forecasts and n=21 for the destination forecast

Indeed, roughly half (54.5%) of these pilots typically
used six or more weather sources.
That being said, on the day of the weather encounter,
the pilots “actually” used slightly fewer weather sources–
between two and seven weather sources to obtain weather
information, with an average of 4.2 sources. Moreover, on
the day of the weather encounter, only 27.3% of the pilots
used six or more weather sources – roughly half of what
was reported as “typically” used.
The type(s) of weather service(s) used by pilots typically
and on the day of the weather encounter were very similar
(Table 3). For instance, the top three weather providers used
on the day of the weather encounter were Flight Service
Stations, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and the Weather Channel. However, that is not
the entire story, as all of the weather providers, except for
one category, were used less frequently on the day of the
event, compared to typical usage rates.

As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5, most flights were
forecast to depart in VMC with the actual weather at
departure the same or better than predicted. However,
most of the pilots (60.0%) encountered adverse weather
enroute, with almost two-thirds of the encounters (64.0%)
occurring past the halfway point of the flight.
Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and icing were the two most frequently encountered weather
conditions. Table 6 shows all types of weather encountered.
Most of the pilots (96.0%) reported being aware of the
adverse weather and where it was headed. However, the
majority of the pilots (96.0%) ended up entering the weather
anyway. In fact, only a little more than half of those pilots
(58.3%) even considered performing a 180 degree turn
to return to the departure airport or an alternate airport.
As expected, the majority of pilots (92.0%) deviated at
some point from their planned route or altitude. The two
pilots who did not deviate from their planned routes were
7

Table 5. Actual weather experienced as compared with forecasted weather3
Better
3
(14.3%)
2
(9.5%)
0
(0%)

Departure Airport
En Route
Destination Airport

Same
16
(76.2%)
6
(28.6%)
4
(44.4%)

Worse
2
(9.5%)
13
(61.9%)
5
(55.6%)

3

Four pilot data points were missing for departure and en route (N=21). Many pilots did not make it to the
intended destination airport (N=9).

Table 6. Type of weather encountered4
Percentage
17.0%

Thunderstorm
Icing

41.7%

IMC

50.0%

Non-Convective
Turbulence

4.2%

MVMC

8.0%
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therefore, the sum of percentages equal more than
100%.

Already Had an IFR Clearance

Figure 2. In-flight services requested.

Because many of the pilots were identified using air
traffic controller flight assists, it is not surprising that
all but one pilot (96.0%) communicated with air traffic
control. A variety of in-flight services were requested of
air traffic control and flight service. While a few (12.0%)
pilots requested as many as five services, the majority
of the pilots made only one (28.0%) or two (24.0%)
requests in-flight. As illustrated in Figure 2, the most

very close to their intended destination or on the taxiway
at the destination airport when the weather encounter occurred. However, the majority who deviated (73.9%) did
so after encountering the weather. Even though a majority
of the participants deviated, 87.5% were aware of where
they were relative to their course and location.
The majority of the pilots (76.0%) reported that they
had previously flown in similar conditions.
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commonly requested in-flight services were vectors to
an airport, weather updates, and PIREPS. Interestingly,
half of the pilots already had IFR clearance for the flight,
and around one-third (36.4%) of the remaining pilots
requested IFR in-flight.
It is interesting to note that more than half of these
weather encounters (56.0%) were exacerbated by equipment failures, which can have dramatic impacts on pilot
decision-making. For example, in a series of studies involving GA pilots, Beringer & Harris (2007) were able
to show that automation-related (i.e., runaway pitchtrim up and down, roll servo failure, roll sensor failure,
and pitch drift up) and mechanical failures (e.g., failed
attitude indicator) can result in the a variety of piloting
errors resulting in the loss of the aircraft. Put simply,
the presence of a mechanical malfunction increases the
likelihood that an error will occur.

With this in mind, the 25 weather encounters were
classified into one of five categories using the interview
data and narrative summary of the encounter provided
by the pilot participants. The categories utilized were:
• Motivation. Referred to by some as “get-home-itis,”
some pilots feel pressured to get to their destination.
That pressure can be either external or internal.
• Lack of complete weather information. In some
instances, pilots do not receive complete weather information and/or do not recognize that the information
provided is insufficient.
• Conflicting weather information.  In some instances,
sources of weather information may be in variance. For
instance, on-board NEXRAD radar may be indicating
a break in convective activity, while ATC and/or Flight
Service may report the same area as IMC.
• Lack of appreciation/understanding of the weather.  
Some pilots may not understand the implications of
the weather, or if they do, they may not appreciate
the threat to flight safety that adverse weather poses.
In effect, these pilots lacked a practical strategy for
managing the weather hazard they faced.
• Not/applicable. This category was included to capture
those encounters that could not be classified within
the previous four categories (e.g., encounters due to
mechanical failures).

DISCUSSION
Human decision-making in general, and pilot decisionmaking in particular, is largely dependent upon three key
elements: 1) information – is the information accurate
and timely; 2) knowledge – does the individual have the
requisite knowledge to utilize the information present;
and 3) experience – has the individual obtained sufficient
experience with a given situation or similar situations
to make a correct assessment (Patterson & Shappell, in
review). The likelihood that a decision will be successful
is markedly reduced if any of these three components are
absent or lacking. It can also be argued that motivation
influences to what extent the three elements (information, knowledge, and experience) will be considered in
the decision-making process.

As can be seen in Figure 3, roughly one-fourth of the
adverse weather encounters were driven by the motivation of pilots to get to their destination. These instances
may explain at least some of the violations that have
been identified in the accident record by Wiegmann et
al. (2005). However, the majority of adverse weather
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weather.

N/A

Table 7. Decision category by type of weather
Hazard
IMC
Icing
Non-convective
Turbulence
Convective
Weather
Marginal VFR

Lack of Appreciation/
Understanding of Weather

Motivation

Conflicting Weather
Information

5
6

4
1

0
1

Lack of Complete
Weather
Information
1
0

0

0

0

1

4

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

encounters were due to a lack of understanding/appreciation of the weather conditions (52.0%). Surprisingly, few
adverse weather encounters were caused by incomplete
or conflicting weather information (8.0%). Note that
four weather encounters did not fit into any of the aforementioned categories. After revisiting the uncategorized
(N/A) encounters, all but one could be attributed to a
technological malfunction (e.g., a malfunctioning onboard weather radar).
What’s more, the lack of understanding/appreciation
of the weather did not seem to be isolated to any specific
type of adverse weather event (Table 7). That is, the lack
of appreciation/understanding of weather was spread
across weather hazards. In contrast, nearly all adverse
weather encounters that involved misplaced motivation
were coupled with general IMC, rather than the more
dangerous convective weather. This suggests that when
faced with exceptionally bad weather, motivation may not
have as much influence on pilot behavior as originally
thought.
In general then, it would appear from this study that
rather than willfully disregarding the rules, many of the
pilots simply committed decision errors, as described
within HFACS1 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Indeed,
these decision errors were consistent with many of the
explanations of why pilots fly into adverse weather, provided by Wiegmann et al. (2008). Explanations such as
the lack of knowledge and experience, poor pre-flight
planning, limited weather evaluation skills, and poor
in-flight planning all would contribute to decision errors
and seem to corroborate the findings presented here.

Does this mean that previous findings (e.g., Wiegmann
et al., 2005; Detwiler et al., 2006) were flawed that suggested that many GA weather-related accidents are due
to violations? Not necessarily. It could be that there are
fundamental differences between fatal and non-fatal
encounters with weather. Indeed, data from those studies
suggest that most fatal weather encounters are associated
with violations, while non-fatal weather encounters are
more indicative of decision errors (Wiegmann et al., 2005;
Detwiler et al., 2006). Obviously, the majority of events
presented here did not involve accidents on fatalities.
It can also be argued that the experience level of the
pilots in this study was considerably higher than those
GA pilots examined in previous analysis of the NTSB
accident database (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002). Roughly
40% of the pilots in the analysis of the NTSB accident
database possessed an instrument rating, while a much
larger proportion (76%) of the pilots in this study were
instrument rated.
On the other hand, and perhaps more troubling, it
could be that the lack of available information following
fatal weather encounters may bias investigators to resort
to explanations more indicative of the willful disregard
for the rules and regulations (i.e., violations). Without
substantiating information from occupants of the aircraft
or those with intimate knowledge of the pilot, field investigators are often left with little more than superficial
descriptions of accidents that may lack the specificity
required to rule out violations. Unfortunately, it will
never truly be known what decisions were made in the
cockpit when the pilots suffer fatal injuries. Indeed, there
may be more to the story. This study showed how pilot
decision-making and the lack of understanding of key
weather information could easily lead to fatal accidents.
For many, it was a matter of good fortune that under
different circumstances (i.e., different amount of fuel,
time of day, lack of ATC assistance, no hole in the cloud
layer), the outcome could have resulted in a serious or
fatal accident.
It is noteworthy that the findings presented here seem
to support those reported by the NTSB (2005). Recall
that NTSB researchers interviewed pilots who were in the

The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
is a theoretically based tool for investigating and analyzing human
error associated with accidents and incidents. HFACS was developed
by expanding upon Reason’s (1990) “Swiss-cheese” model of human
error. The basic premise underlying this taxonomy is that an accident
is generally a series of events. The sequence of preceding events are
purported to include both latent and active errors. The HFACS
taxonomy defines 19 causal categories of human error whereby the
accident’s progression is categorized. These categories are housed
within four levels (i.e., unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts,
unsafe supervision, and organizational influences) of human error.
See Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) for an in-depth description.
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general vicinity of those whose encounter with adverse
weather resulted in a fatal accident. In contrast, the pilots
interviewed in this study actually encountered the weather.
Consistent with the “accident pilots” in the NTSB
study, many of the pilots interviewed in this study were
older and started flight training later in life – both areas of
concern identified by the NTSB (NTSB, 2005). Likewise,
the data presented here regarding use of weather resources
by pilots are consistent with that observed for pilots flying in the vicinity of the accident pilots. Specifically, the
data presented here suggest that pilots utilize a variety
of weather sources and that no identifiable “standard”
approach to weather pre-flight planning appears to exist
within GA. Unfortunately, it remains largely unknown
what specific weather sources the accident pilots in the
NTSB study utilized.
Given the proliferation of commercial weather products
and on-board weather equipment, it may be time to move
toward some form of standard weather package that all
pilots would review before flying. Exactly what products/
equipment should be used remains to be defined; however,
it is clear that some weather products and providers are
considered more useful and/or are accessed more often
than others (NASA, 2007). For instance, FSS, DUATS,
and NOAA/NWS, were all utilized in both the NASA
study and here. Similarly, Knecht (2008a) surveyed 230
GA pilots from locations across the country (CA, OK,
ND, IL, FL) and found that the FAA standard briefing
was used on a majority of flights, followed by the NWS/
NOAA and DUATS. Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002)
found close agreement, for the most part, between the
ratings of weather information items by both novice and
experienced pilots. They recommended, based upon these
findings, that one could develop algorithms, not unlike
Pilot’s Associate, that would prioritize weather information by phase of flight for presentation on flight-deck
displays, thereby potentially reducing display clutter and
emphasizing salience.
Of course, simply accessing weather data does not
necessarily mean that one paid attention to relevant
information or that the information was even fully understood. It is sound and practical weather training and
decision-making that can prevent accidents. For instance,
Knecht (2008a) found that pilots spent an average of 17-20
minutes reviewing information from weather products/
providers prior to departure and 7 minutes reviewing
information while enroute. However, the bottom 5% of
the pilots sampled only spent 5-7 minutes on products/
providers, and less than 2 minutes enroute. Whether or
not relevant weather information can be extracted in
such little time depends upon the nature of the weather
and the end user’s proficiency. However, it is somewhat

disconcerting that something as critical as weather information could be allotted only a few minutes during
pre-flight planning and even less in-flight.
Unfortunately, similar information was not obtained
in this study. What we were able to determine was the
type of weather information pilots possessed or had available during the flight. Specifically, archival AIRMET/
SIGMET reports, weather radar data, and interview data
made it possible to compare the information that pilots
had versus the information actually available during the
time of the encounter. An examination of the pilot responses in this study revealed that in most encounters there
were more data sources available than the pilot actually
accessed/obtained. In some situations, for example, the
appropriate AIRMET/SIGMET was in effect along the
route of flight and/or radar echoes were present, yet the
pilot did not obtain them, or if they did, the information
was misunderstood.
It would appear that knowledge and training about
specific weather products and what information they
can provide might prevent encounters with adverse
weather from happening in the future. On the surface,
this recommendation may seem obvious and perhaps
redundant, given that weather-related training is required
of all pilots before licensure. However, a review of training requirements for weather hazards reveals that private
pilot applicants “must receive and log ground training from
an authorized instructor or complete a home-study course on
… recognition of critical weather situations from the ground
and in flight, windshear avoidance, and the procurement
and use of aeronautical weather reports and forecasts” (14
CFR 61.105). Even VFR-only pilots are given some
instrument flight training as a precaution, so they can
“maintain control of an aircraft while making a course
reversal or diversion if they inadvertently enter clouds”
(NTSB, 2005).
The issue is not whether or not a pilot should receive
meteorological training – the regulations clearly state
that they should and requirements are in place to ensure
training is provided. The better question is “How does
one adequately educate and train a pilot applicant to
guarantee that the aforementioned requirements are met?”
There appears to be no standard in the case of educating
pilots on meteorology and training them to use weather
analysis and forecast products properly. In fact, the only
specific hazard discussed in the regulations cited above
is wind shear. An interesting comparison can be made
to stall recovery and avoidance training. During primary
flight training, the student receives hands-on experience
in stalls. This is straightforward, as stall training can be
easily introduced. Practical introductions to managing
weather-hazard areas cannot be as easily simulated.
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CONCLUSIONS AND
LESSONS LEARNED

One source of training materials and a useful resource
is the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM; FAA
[2008]). The AIM includes a description of weather products as well as additional sources of weather information.
However, while the AIM details many of these products,
there are no specifics on what is required to be taught. It
is unclear if pilots have been trained to interpret weather
products adequately and make sound decisions based on
their interpretation, or if they were taught just enough
about each product to pass an examination. Should the
latter scenario be the case, then it is possible that once an
examination is over, a pilot may rarely consult some or
all of these products in the future due to an incomplete
understanding during initial training.
It is also interesting to note that a pilot can get all aviation weather questions wrong on the airman knowledge
test (suggesting a total lack of weather knowledge), yet still
pass the exam enroute to a private pilot’s license (Wiegmann et al., 2008; NTSB, 2005). Likewise, during the
required biennial flight review (BFR), “… the instructor
giving the flight review is free to determine the content;
therefore, the BFR may or may not include a demonstration of the weather knowledge and instrument flight
skills required for initial certification” (NTSB, 2005).
Therefore, it is conceivable that after becoming certified
a pilot would not be capable of interpreting risks associated with adverse weather and throughout their career
may never be required to demonstrate knowledge on
aviation-specific weather information products. Perhaps
what is needed is either a refinement of the current airman
knowledge test requirements, required weather-related
items on the BFR, or some new approach to weather
instruction like scenario-based weather training/testing.
Maybe then, an improved understanding of weather and
its implications while flying can be fostered throughout
the GA community.
Finally, it would be disingenuous to suggest that all 25
adverse weather encounters were solely human factorsrelated, since more than half of the weather encounters
were associated with some form of equipment failure.
A sampling of the mechanical failures encountered by
the pilots in this study included bad cells of an aircraft’s
battery; malfunctioning communication and navigation
equipment like the radios, VOR (VHF Omnidirectional
Range), GPS, and DME (Distance Measuring Equipment)). In each case, the aircraft was still operational;
however, at a minimum, the equipment failure(s) produced a distraction but, in some cases, exacerbated the
encounter with adverse weather.

Although the data presented here embodied the collective experiences of 25 GA pilots who encountered
adverse weather in flight, the data have limitations. For
instance, the sample was small and does not directly
reflect the regional distribution of pilots within the U.S.
Specifically, none of the pilots in this study were from the
Western-Pacific or Central Regions. Furthermore, even
though the largest number of participants came from the
Northwest Mountain Region, none of the pilots were
from Alaska where GA aviation is a prominent form
of transportation. Likewise, roughly 3/4ths of the pilots
interviewed in this study held an instrument rating. This
is similar to the Nall report’s findings that slightly over
half of the pilots involved in weather-related accidents
were instrument-rated (AOPA, 2008).
It can also be argued that the pilots who volunteered
to participate in our study did so because they felt that
they simply made an honest mistake and did not willfully violate existing Federal Air Regulations (FARs).
Whereas, the others who did not volunteer, may have
declined because they knew that they were in violation and may have been reluctant to participate in an
FAA-sponsored inquiry into why pilots fly into adverse
weather. While it is impossible to know precisely why
many pilots declined to participate (i.e., we did not ask
them), it is possible that their participation would have
increased the number of motivation-related encounters
with adverse weather that may have driven the number
of willful violations of FARs closer to those seen in
previous GA accident studies.
Nevertheless, the data presented here do shed additional light on the conundrum of why a GA pilot would
fly into adverse weather. Contrary to what the accident
record seems to suggest, flight into adverse weather
seems to be primarily due to the lack of appreciation/
understanding of the hazards associated with adverse
weather. Perhaps some encounters with adverse weather
were motivated by outside influences or exacerbated by
some manner of mechanical failure that may have led to
the willful acceptance of unnecessary hazards. Simply
put, there may be more to the story.
Furthermore, it would appear that additional effort should be placed in training, both ab initio and
recurrent. Emphasis should be placed on ensuring a
full understanding of the adverse impact of weather,
including the recognition of IMC, icing, convective
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events, etc. Moreover, we recommend a standard weather
briefing that includes multiple, converging sources of
information.
In addition to analyzing the interview data to determine
trends and patterns, it was also our intent to develop
disciplined methods for analyzing future accidents and
incidents. Ideally, this would enable investigators to
better learn from these incidents, improve correction of
involved personnel, and generate interventions. Specifically, we planned to generate a list of items and/or data
points for investigators to gain a better understanding of
what happened within a particular weather event. The
structured interview and weather information gathered
met that goal.
We had also intended to derive a simple standard
protocol aimed at identifying relevant weather-related
events that could be used by Flight Standards or other
research teams, but this did not happen. Unfortunately,
identifying cases by reviewing lists of flight assists and
weather events listed in The Administrator’s Daily Alert
Bulletins was extremely time-consuming.

Selecting a set of potential adverse weather encounters
was only the first step. A great deal of work remained to
identify the appropriate FSDO, gain access to pilot contact
information, contact the potential pilot-participant, and
garner informed consent. However, in some cases, the
FSDO did not have contact information or they did not
have a record of the event. This was surprising because,
according to the FAA’s Air Traffic Quality Assurance
process, flights assists are to be reported to the appropriate FSDO via the Regional Operations Center (ROC)
within 3 hours of occurrence (7210.56C; FAA, 2002).
If the process of this study were to be duplicated
or initiated as a proactive collection of near-miss data,
the procedure would need to become formalized and
streamlined across air traffic facilities and FSDOs. In
addition, it would be useful if the standard flight assist
form could be modified to archive key weather-related
variables, many of which are identified within the structured interview used. Alternatively, the survey could be
modified and streamlined for use by ASIs when conducting their investigations.
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Appendix A
A. Aircraft Information
1. Aircraft Type
2. Aircraft ownership (Own (full or part), rent, other)?
B. Basic Aircrew Information (Confirming demographic data)
1. Age at time of incident
2. Education (HS, College, graduate)
3. Profession/Occupation
4. Gender
5. When did you first learn to fly?
6. Total Flight Hours
7. Flight Hours in Make/Model
8. Flight Hours in the last 90 days
9. Total Cross-Country Flight Hours (cross country defined as greater than 25nm from airport)
10. Cross Country Flight Hours in last 90 days
11. Ratings/Certificates
12. Are you instrument rated? If so, how much instrument experience have you had (simulated and actual)?
13. Do you participate in the WINGS program?
14. Date of most recent flight instruction
15. Year of most recent biennial flight review (BFR)
16. Date of most recent medical exam
17. Class of medical certificate (Class I, II, or III)
		 a. Any waivers/limitations on the medical certificate
18. If you used any of the following equipment, have you had training on it? If yes, what kind and how much?
		 a. Communication Equipment
		 b. De-icing Equipment
		 c. Weather-avoidance Equipment
		 d. Terrain-avoidance Equipment
		 e. Autopilot
		 f. GPS
		 g. Additional Avionics (i.e., Altitude alert, radar altimeters)
		 h. Multifunctional Displays (i.e. GPWS, TCAS)
C. Event Information
1. Please describe the day of the flight.
2. What was the purpose of the flight? (air tour, business, emergency medical, ferry, freight, passenger, pleasure,
training)
3. Have you made this trip before? If so, how many times?
4. Preflight
		 a. What is your normal method of preflight planning
		 b. Was your method of preflight planning on the day of the incident different from normal?
		 c. Did you attempt to obtain pre-flight weather information?
			 1. If yes, when was the last time you checked weather before flight
		 d. Did you have an alternate plan with alternate airports worked out in advance?
		 e. Did you consider the geography along the flight route (e.g. mountains, rising terrain, etc.)?
		 f. Which weather provider(s) were used?
			 1. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NWS)
			 2. Flight Service Station
			 3. Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS)
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			 4. Commercial Vendors
			 5. Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service
			 6. Transcribed Weather Broadcast (TWB)
			 7. Pilot Automatic Telephone Weather Answering Service
			 8. En-route Flight Advisory Service
			 9. The Weather Channel
			 10. Other Pilots
			 11. Other (please specify):
				 a. What type of information did you gather?
		 g. What weather providers(s) do you typically use?
			 1. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NWS)
			 2. Flight Service Station
			 3. Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS)
			 4. Commercial Vendors
			 5. Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service
			 6. Transcribed Weather Broadcast (TWB)
			 7. Pilot Automatic Telephone Weather Answering Service
			 8. En-route Flight Advisory Service
			 9. The Weather Channel
			 10. Other Pilots
			 11. Other (please specify):
		 h. Were any of your attempts to obtain pre-flight weather information unsuccessful? If yes, why?
			 1. Did not know or were unable to find telephone or access numbers
			 2. No telephone available
			 3. No answer on telephone
			 4. Telephone briefer did not have all requested information available
			 5. Telephone briefer denied service
			 6. No online access available
			 7. Could not connect online
			 8. Could not maintain online connection
			 9. Required information not available on computer
			 10. Experienced difficulty with computer interface
			 11. Other (please specify)
		 i. What was the preflight weather forecast for the following?
			 1. Departure airport (VMC/Marginal VMC/IMC)
			 2. En-route (VMC/Marginal VMC/IMC)
			 3. Destination airport (VMC/Marginal VMC/IMC)
			 4. Did not obtain a preflight weather briefing
				 a. If you did NOT attempt to obtain pre-flight weather information prior to departure, why not?
					 i. Did not believe pre-departure weather was necessary
					 ii. Was intimidated by process of obtaining weather
					 iii. Did not know or was unable to find telephone or access number
					 iv. No Telephone available
					 v. No online access available
					 vi. Other (please specify)
		 j. What was the planned length of flight?
		 k. Where did you depart from and when?
		 l. Where did you arrive and when?
		 m. What type of approach was planned for your destination? (CAT I, CAT II, CAT III)
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		 n. Did you get a good night’s sleep the night before?
		 o. How were you feeling on the day of the flight (e.g. sick, allergies, etc)?
5. In-flight
		 a. What were the environmental conditions?
			 1. Lighting conditions? (Day, Night, Dawn, Dusk, Cloudy, Sunny, Bright, Dark, etc…)
			 2. Weather
			 3. Temperature (degrees Fahrenheit)
		 b. What was the weather like?
			 1. At departure
			 2. At destination
			 3. During the Route
		 c. Were you under any pressure to get to your destination?
		 d. Did you have to deviate from the planned route or altitude?
			 1. If yes, was it before or after you encountered weather?
		 e. Were you aware of your course and location throughout the flight?
		 f. Did you communicate with ATC?
		 g. Did you communicate with any other en-route services (e.g. flight service stations)?
		 h. What in-flight services did you request?
			 1. Emergency climb/descent
			 2. IFR clearance
			 3. Vectors to an airport
			 4. Vectors to VMC
			 5. PIREPS
			 6. Weather Updates
			 7. IAP
			 8. Other (please specify)
		 i. Were there any distractions in the cockpit? (e.g., passengers, malfunctions.)?
		 j. Was all the equipment working during the flight?
		 k. What was your level of awareness of the weather (e.g., Did you know where the bad weather was headed?)
6.	Upon encountering the weather
		 a. During what point of the flight did you encounter weather?
			 1. Was the pilot past the midpoint of the flight before realizing there was trouble?
		 b. Was the actual weather better than, the same as, or worse than forecasted
			 1. Departure (Better/Same/Worse)
			 2. En-route (Better/Same/Worse)
			 3. Destination (Better/Same/Worse)
		 c. Can you explain your thought processes upon encountering the weather?
		 d. Can you explain how you felt upon encountering the weather?
		 e. Did you enter the weather?
			 1. If yes, did you consider flying a 180?
		 f. Have you ever experienced similar weather conditions in-flight?
			 1. If yes, what did you do?
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
1. Is there anything that you feel we should know?
2. What did you do that prevented this incident from being worse?
3. Knowing what you know now, would you have done anything differently?
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